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The Body Politic in the Social and Political Thought of Christine 




Abstract: While some scholars have seen the political theory of Christine de Pizan as being 
very like that of her sources in its presentation of hierarchy as the basis of rightful order, 
others have stressed the originality of her thought and have judged her conception of society 
to be more inclusive and egalitarian than that found in traditional conceptions of the body 
politic. Here it is argued that while Christine stressed the importance of reciprocity and 
mutuality within the political community, she also emphasised the need for hierarchy and 
deference and that, even by medieval standards, she was profoundly suspicious of popular 
involvement in political life. Part II of this article argues that this political theory was simply 
one expression of a much broader social outlook, one which relied on the Aristotelian notion 
of “distributive justice” in order to reconcile the ideals of hierarchy and obedience with the 
achievement of justice and equity.  
 
Résumé: Pour certains commentateurs de l’œuvre de Christine de Pizan, la pensée politique 
de cette dernière est presque identique à celle de ses prédécesseurs, dans la mesure où c’est 
la hiérarchie qui servirait de fondement essentiel du bon ordre. En revanche, d’autres érudits 
ont insisté sur l’originalité de la pensée christinienne en ce qui concerne sa conception de la 
société qu’ils estiment plus inclusive et égalitaire que celle préconisée d’habitude dans le 
discours médiéval sur le corps de policie. À notre avis, Christine, tout en soulignant 
l’importance de la réciprocité et de la solidarité dans la communauté politique, met 
néanmoins l’accent sur la nécessité de la hiérarchie et de la déférence dans celle-ci ; en effet, 
elle se distingue de ses contemporains par son degré de méfiance quant à toute participation 
du peuple dans la vie politique. Dans la deuxième partie de cet article, nous tenons à replacer 
cet aspect de la pensée politique de Christine dans le contexte de sa conception plus large de 
la société, conception basée sur l’idée aristotélicienne de la “justice distributive” afin de 
concilier les idéaux de la hiérarchie et de l’obéissance avec l’instauration de la justice et de 
l’équité.  
 
Although the work of Christine de Pizan (c. 1364-c.1430) now enjoys a central 
place in the canon of late medieval literature and thought, the nature and originality of 
                                                            
1 Part II of this article will appear in the next issue of CRMH. A longer version of this article, 
which includes more detailed references to the primary sources and to the secondary 
literature, will also appear in the electronic version of this journal in the Miscellanées section. 
In writing this article, I have benefitted greatly from the generosity of Tracy Adams, who 
commented on a previous version of it, and from the guidance provided by Craig Taylor and 
Sigbørn Sønnesyn. As always, I am indebted to Robert Nash for the many stylistic and structural 
improvements which he suggested to my work. I am particularly grateful to Angus Kennedy for 
his comments and advice and, above all, to Rosalind Brown-Grant for sharing her expertise on 
Christine de Pizan with me. 
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her political and social theory remains extremely controversial.2 For some scholars, the 
outlook developed by Christine in works such as the Livre des fais et bonnes meurs du 
sage roy Charles V, (1404), the Livre du corps de policie (c.1404-07), and the Livre de 
paix (1412-13) is very similar to that of the earlier political thinkers whom she drew 
upon.3 As a result, her views are interpreted as being “consistently conservative” in their 
emphasis on hierarchy within the community as a precondition of social and political 
order.4 By contrast, others have characterized Christine’s political theory in very 
                                                            
2 For excellent introductions to Christine’s life and works, see C. C. Willard, Christine de 
Pizan: Her Life and Works, New York, Persea, 1984 and N. Margolis, An Introduction to 
Christine de Pizan, Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2011. 
3 For the convenience of readers, references to works by Christine de Pizan are given in the form 
of abbreviated titles in the text (for abbreviated references to John of Salisbury’s Policraticus and 
to Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum, see notes 8 and 9, below).  Abbreviated titles: AB: 
Autres Ballades in Oeuvres Poétiques de Christine de Pisan, Volume I, ed. M. Roy, Paris, 
Librairie de Firmin Didot et Cie, 1886; BBP: Christine de Pizan, The Book of the Body Politic, 
ed. K. L. Forhan, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994; BCL: Christine de Pizan, The 
Book of the City of Ladies, ed. R. Brown-Grant, London, Penguin, 1999; BDAC: Christine de 
Pizan, The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry, ed. S. Willard and. C. C. Willard, 
University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999; BP: The Book of Peace by 
Christine de Pizan, ed.  K. Green, C. J. Mews and J. Pinder, University Park, Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2008; CB: Cent Ballades in Oeuvres Poétiques de Christine de Pisan, Volume 
I, ed. M. Roy, Paris, Librairie de Firmin Didot et Cie,1886; CD: Christine de Pizan, La Città 
delle Dame, ed. E. J. Richards, Milan, Luni Editrice, 1998; CLE: Christine de Pizan, Le chemin de 
longue étude, ed. A. Tarnowski, Paris, Le Livre de Poche, 2000; DJA: Christine de Pizan, Ditié de 
Jehanne d’Arc, ed. A. J. Kennedy and K. Varty, Medium Aevum Monographs, n.s. 9, 1977; EO: 
Christine de Pizan, Epistre Othea, ed. G. Parussa, Paris, Droz, 1999;  EPVH: Christine de Pizan’s 
Epistre de la prison de la vie humaine, ed. A. J. Kennedy, Glasgow, University of Glasgow, 1984; 
ERF: Christine de Pizan, Une epistre a la royne de France, in “The Epistle of the Prison of Life” 
with “An Epistle to the Queen of France” and “Lament on the Evils of Civil War”, ed. J. A. 
Wisman, New York, Garland, 1984; LAC: Christine de Pizan, Le livre de l’advision Cristine, ed. 
C. Reno and Liliane Dulac, Paris, Honoré Champion, 2001;  LCP: Christine de Pizan, Le livre 
du corps de policie, ed. A. J. Kennedy, Paris, Honoré Champion,1998; LFBM: Christine de 
Pizan Le livre des fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles V, ed. S. Solente, 2 volumes, 
Paris, Société de l’Histoire de France, 1936, cited by volume and page reference; LMF: 
Christine de Pizan, La lamentacion sur les maux de la France de Christine de Pizan, in  Mélanges 
de langue et litérature françaises du Moyen Âge et de la Renaissance offerts à Charles Foulon, 
ed.  A. J. Kennedy, Rennes, Institut de Français, Université de Haute-Bretagne, 1980, p. 177-
85; LTV: Christine de Pizan, Le livre des trois vertus, ed. C. C. Willard and E. Hicks, Paris, 
Honoré Champion, 1989;  LWF: Lamentation on the Woes of France, in The Writings of 
Christine de Pizan. ed. C. C. Willard, New York, Persea, 1994, p. 304-309;  MF: Christine de 
Pizan,  Le livre de la mutacion de Fortune, ed. S. Solente, 4 volumes; Paris, A. and J. Picard, 
1959-1966; TCL: Christine de Pizan, The Treasure of the City of Ladies, or The Book of the 
Three Virtues, ed. S. Lawson, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985; VCP: The Vision of Christine de 
Pizan, ed. G. McLeod and C. C. Willard, Woodbridge, D. S. Brewer, 2005. 
4 Willard, Christine de Pizan, p. 182;  R. L.  Krueger, “Christine’s Anxious Lessons: Gender, 
Morality and the Social Order from the Enseignements to the Avision”, Christine de Pizan and 
the Categories of Difference, ed. Marilynn Desmond , Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 1998, p. 16-40, at p. 18; J. Quillet, “Community, Counsel and Representation’”, The 
Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c.350-c.1450. ed. J. H. Burns, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 520-72, at p. 542-3; J. Quillet, De Charles V à Christine de 
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different terms, portraying it as highlighting the “democratic currents” which were 
present in the France of Christine’s own day and as being consistent with her inclusive 
and egalitarian feminism in its advocacy of “involving the people in government” and 
in offering an expansion of the political realm as “a solution to the problem posed by 
tyranny”.5 In this approach, the stress is not so much on Christine’s debt to earlier 
writers but rather on the originality of her political philosophy, either in its 
foreshadowing of the work of later thinkers, such as Machiavelli or Erasmus, or in its 
anticipation of modern political values in being inclusive, proto-democratic, pacifist, 
anti-clerical, secular and egalitarian. 
In particular, the view of Christine’s political theory as being characterised by its 
inclusivity has been set out in a number of important articles by Cary J. Nederman. For 
Nederman, Christine’s work forms part of a broader shift in 14th- and 15th-century 
political philosophy towards a more reciprocal and egalitarian notion of how the 
political community should be organized. In this perspective, Christine’s political 
theory seems to exemplify a new understanding of the “body politic”, a metaphor which 
had long been central in medieval political thought. Traditionally, the organic analogy, 
and the obedience of the body’s members to its head, had usually been invoked in order 
to legitimate monarchical authority and, more generally, to demonstrate the need for 
hierarchy, deference and subordination within the social order.6 By contrast, Nederman 
argues that later middle ages witnessed the emergence of a new conception of the body 
politic with thinkers such as Marsilius of Padua, Nicholas of Cusa, Nicole Oresme and 
John Fortescue now emphasising the accountability of rulers to the political community 
and presenting rulers as being constrained by the same laws which bound their subjects. 
The orthodox “head-orientated conception” of the body politic was now replaced with 
the idea that “there is a natural equilibrium within the body – a sort of equitable 
harmony – that must be maintained for the sake of the health and well-being of the 
organism. Equalization means that no part of the entity can legitimately lay stake to a 
disproportionate amount of common resources and/or refuse to share what it possesses 
when required for the common good. No part (not even the clergy) is greater than the 
whole. The operation of the body is thus a homeostatic process, in which a premium is 
placed on intercommunication and exchange among the various limbs and organs 
themselves, as a result of which the head (or ruler) is treated as a servant of the whole 
rather than as a commander”. For Nederman, the political theory of Christine de Pizan, 
in particular her Livre du corps de policie, develops the “emphasis on equilibrium” 
                                                                                                                                           
Pizan , Paris, Perrin, 2004, p. 41, 145;  S. Delany, Medieval Literary Politics: Shapes of Ideology, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1990, p. 95-6; C. C. Willard, “Christine de Pizan: From 
Poet to Political Commentator”, Politics, Gender and Genre: The Political Theory of Christine de 
Pizan. ed. M. Brabant, Boulder, Westview, 1992, p. 17-32, at p. 29; F. Autrand, Christine de 
Pizan: une femme en politique, Paris, Fayard, 2009, p. 326-7, 364-8. 
5 C. Reno, “Christine de Pizan: ‘At Best a Contradictory Figure’?”,  in Brabant, Politics, Gender 
and Genre p. 172-91, at p. 174-5; E. J. Richards, “Bartolo da Sassaferrato as a Possible Source for 
Christine’s Livre de paix”,  Healing the Body Politic: The Political Thought of Christine de 
Pizan. ed. Karen Green and Constant J. Mews, Turnhout, Brepols, 2005,  p. 81-97, at p. 96-7; M. 
Brabant and M. Brint, “Identity and Difference in Christine de Pizan’s Cité des dames”, in 
Brabant, Politics, Gender and Genre, p. 207-22, at p. 217. 
6 S. H. Rigby, “Aristotle for Aristocrats and Poets: Giles of Rome's De regimine principum as 
Theodicy of Privilege”, Chaucer Review, 46, 2011-12, p. 259-313, at p. 271-3. 
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found in Nicole Oresme’s work so as to produce an “inclusive, reciprocal, and 
interdependent conception” of the body politic and of the relationship between the 
French people and their kings. Rather than merely focusing on the prince and nobility, 
she expresses her “deep concern about the needs and interests” of women, city-dwellers 
and the lower social orders, valuing the contribution made to society by the common 
people and expressing her sympathy for the sufferings of the poor. Christine therefore 
“extends the more equitable line of organic thinking” that she may have inherited from 
Nicole Oresme towards an emphasis on the need for the government to frame its 
policies with consideration for their impact on all the members of society and especially 
upon those who are “most vulnerable to the use of power and least able to protect 
themselves”.7 
Did Christine de Pizan’s political theory form part of a contemporary shift away 
from an emphasis on hierarchy and strict inequality within the body politic towards a 
more reciprocal, inclusive or egalitarian vision of the political community? Part I of this 
article offers an assessment of the nature and originality of Christine’s thought by 
comparing it with the political theory of her predecessors, in particular with John of 
Salisbury’s Policraticus (1159), a work with which she was familiar in the form of the 
French translation by Denis Foulechat (1372),8 and with Giles of Rome’s De regimine 
                                                            
7 C. J. Nederman, “Body Politics: the Diversification of Organic Metaphors in the Later Middle 
Ages”, Pensiero Politico Medievale, 2, 2004, p. 59-87, at  p. 60-1, 63-8, 73-8, 80-88; C. J. 
Nederman, “The Living Body Politic: the Diversification of Organic Metaphors in Nicole Oresme 
and Christine de Pizan”, in Green and Mews, Healing the Body Politic,  p. 19-33, at 19-26, 32-3;  
C. J. Nederman, “The Expanding Body Politic: Christine de Pizan and the Medieval Roots of 
Political Economy”, Au champ des escriptures: IIIe colloque international sur Christine de Pizan, 
Lausanne, 18-22 Juillet, 1998, ed. E. Hicks, Honoré Champion, Paris, 2000, p. 383-97, at p. 387-
90. 
8 For the Latin text of John of Salisbury’s Policraticus, see Ioannis Saresberiensis Epsicopi 
Carnotensis Policraticus sive De Nugis Curialum et Vestigiis Philosophorum, Libri VIII, ed. C. C. 
I. Webb, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1909; two volumes. The Latin text is also available in 
Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Latina, volume 199. ed. J.-P. Migné, Paris, Garnier, 1900, 
and K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, Ioannis Saresberiensis: Policraticus I-IV, Turnhout, Brepols, 1993. A 
complete English translation of the Policraticus is provided by Frivolities of Courtiers and 
Footprints of Philosophers, being a Translation of the First, Second and Third Books and 
Selections from the Seventh and Eighth Books of the Policraticus of John of Salisbury, ed. J. B. 
Pike, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1938,  and The Statesman’s Book of John of 
Salisbury, Being the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth Books and a Selection from the Seventh and Eighth 
Books of the Policraticus, ed. J. Dickinson, New York, Russell and Russell, 1963.  For a more 
recent partial translation, see John of Salisbury, Policraticus: Of the Frivolities of Courtiers, the 
Footprints of the Philosophers, ed. C. J. Nederman , Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, 
1990 (see, however, the review by Michael Winterbottom in Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 43, 
1992, p. 145-6). For the parts of Foulechat’s version which have so far appeared in print, see 
Denis Foulechat, Le Policratique de Jean de Salisbury (1372), Livres I-III, ed. C. Brucker, 
Geneva, Droz, 1994; Le Policaticus de Jean de Salisbury traduit par Denis Foulechat (1372). 
(Manuscrit  no. 24287 de la B.N.), ed. C. Brucker, Nancy, Presses Universitaires de Nancy 1985, 
for Book IV; Denis Foulechat, Le Policratique de Jean de Salisbury (1372), Livre  V, ed. C. 
Brucker, Geneva, Droz, 2006;  Denis Foulechat: tyrans, princes et prêtres (Jean de Salisbury, 
Policratique IV et VIII), ed. C. Brucker, in Le Moyen Français, 21, 1987, for Book IV and 
Book VIII: 17-23. In the text above, the Policraticus (abbreviated as “Pol”) is cited by the book 
and chapter numbers which are common to the Latin version (in Webb’s edition), to Foulechat 
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principum (c. 1280), a work she may have known in its original Latin version and 
which she had certainly read in its French translation by Henri de Gauchy (c. 1282).9 It 
argues that, in fact, the basic principles underlying Christine’s political outlook were in 
accord with these earlier works of medieval political theory, to which she had access in 
the French royal library. Part II of this article (in the next issue of CRMH) shows that 
Christine’s political theory, with its emphasis on both reciprocity and hierarchy, formed 
part of a wider social outlook within which she attempted to reconcile justice and 
inequality. It concludes that the originality of Christine’s achievement lay not so much 
in her having arrived at a new political outlook but rather in the novel means which she 
found to present afresh to her readers views with which they were already extremely 
familiar. 
 
Christine’s Political Theory 
Reciprocity within the body politic 
Did Christine de Pizan’s work, in particular her focus on the reciprocity that 
should exist between the parts of the body politic, represent a shift away from the 
principles on which medieval political theory had traditionally been based? It is 
certainly true that Christine’s work devotes more attention to the situation of the lower 
orders of society than do many medieval mirrors for princes. Developing the image of 
the body politic with which she was familiar from John of Salisbury’s Policraticus 
(Pol: I: 1 (p. 4)) and the glossed translation of Valerius Maximus’s Memorable Doings 
and Sayings produced by Simon de Hesdin and Nicolas de Gonesse between 1375 and 
1401, Christine insists that, just as the belly, legs and feet of the body are necessary if 
the whole is to be perfect and healthy, so the common people, who “support and have 
the burden of all the rest of the body”, are indispensable for the health and functioning 
of society.10 Without merchants, artisans and peasants who provide “things proper and 
necessary for human beings to live” and who feed and nourish their fellows then 
                                                                                                                                           
and to the modern English versions by Dickinson, Pike and Nederman, and, where appropriate, by 
the page numbers in Nederman’s translation. 
9 There is no complete modern edition of the Latin text of Giles of Rome’s De regimine 
principum. Here, I have cited the Latin edition published in Rome in 1482 by Stephanus Plannck 
but have particularly relied on the recent edition of John Trevisa’s Middle English translation of 
the text which is a faithful version of Giles’s text and which, unlike Gauchy’s Livres du 
gouvernement, retains Giles’s original chapter divisions. Reference to these works is given in the 
form of abbreviated titles in the text. Abbreviations: DRP:  Egidius Romanus, De regimine 
principum , Rome, Stephanus Plannck, 1482; GKP: Giles of Rome, The Governance of Kings and 
Princes: John Trevisa’s Middle English Translation of the De Regimine Principum of Aegeidius 
Romanus, ed. D. C. Fowler, C. F. Briggs and P. G. Remley, New York, Garland, 1997, cited by 
page reference; LGR: Li Livres du Gouvernement des Rois: A XIIIth Century French Version of 
Egidio Colonna’s Treatise De Regimine Principum, ed. S. P. Molenaer, New York, Macmillan, 
1899, cited by page reference. 
10 Valerius Maximus, Simon de Hesdin and Nicolas de  Gonesse, Facta et dicta memorabilia, 
Southern Netherlands: Printer of Flavius Josephus, 1475, fol. 379v-380r; A. J. Kennedy, “The 
Image of the Body Politic in Christine de Pizan’s Livre du corps de policie”,  L’Offrande du 
cœur: Medieval and Early Modern Studies in Honour of Glynnis Crop. ed. M. Burrell and J. 
Grant, Christchurch, NZ, Canterbury University Press, 2004, p. 18-29, at p. 18, 21; Kennedy, 
“Introduction”,  in Le livre du corps de policie , p. xxxiii-vi. 
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“neither the estate of kings and princes nor even the polities of cities and countries 
could exist” (BBP/LCP: I: 1; III: 1; III: 8-10; MF: 4071-4128, 5131-6580). Christine 
also shows an awareness of the sufferings experienced by the common people of France 
in her own day, sympathizing with those who were despoiled and pillaged by the king’s 
own soldiers or who were driven to starvation by the burden of taxation (LCP: I: 9 (p. 
14-15); I: 11 (p. 17-18); III: 10 (p. 108); BP: I: 9 (p. 16-17); I: 11 (p. 20); III: 10 (p. 
109); BDAC I: XIV (p. 41); III: VII (p. 152). In her Livre des trois vertus, she advises 
princesses not to permit their officials “to take anything from the people against their 
will or at an unfair price” and to ensure that “the poor people of the villages and other 
places” are paid promptly for their produce (TCL: I: 19; I: 22; LTV: I: 20; I: 23). 
Similarly, in her Livre de paix, Christine stresses the need for the king to make sure that 
justice is provided by his officials to the “poor and simple” and argues that princes had 
been established on earth to aid widows, orphans or anyone else with a just cause (BP: 
II: 6, 9, 22; see also LFBM I: 62, 83, 133; LMF: 184-5; LWF: 308; BDAC: I: IV). 
Nevertheless, the fact that Christine included the commons as indispensable 
members of society and that she sympathized with the plight of the poor and the 
powerless does not mean that her political theory was either innovative or anti-
hierarchical. After all, political thinkers such as John of Salisbury had long taught that 
the members of society who should be “advanced most”’ by the prince are “those who 
can do least for themselves” and that it was particularly necessary for the “head” of the 
body politic to look after the peasants whose position as the “feet” of society meant that 
they were most likely to come into peril. John thus invoked the Book of Job (Job 29: 
12-13; 31: 16-40) as a warning to the prince about the sorry fate of those who failed to 
give charity to the poor, to widows and to orphans or who were guilty of eating “the 
fruits of the land without payment and have assaulted the livelihood of the peasant” 
(agricola/”laboureur”).11 He bemoaned the fate of the poor who are “oppressed with 
injuries, enfeebled by exactions, [and] despoiled by extensive pillaging” and demanded 
that the ruler should prevent the powerful from exacting wealth from the humble by 
means of violence and fear (Pol:  IV: 2 (p. 31); IV: 5 (p. 40); V: 2 (p. 67). V: 6 –7 (p. 
71, 74-6); V: 8 (p. 80-1); V: 15 (p. 95); V: 17 (p. 101); VI: 26 (p. 141); VII; 25 (p. 175-
6); VIII: 12 (p. 183); VIII: 22 (p. 214)). Similarly, Giles of Rome had argued that, 
unlike the tyrant who pillages and steals from his subjects, a “true” king would seek to 
defend the community and would care for widows and orphans, explaining that 
“orphans” should be understood to refer to all those who lacked the power to defend 
themselves (GKP: 20, 317, 338; LGR: 17, 294, 317). Here, however, he was hardly 
being original as, from the 7th-century Pseudo-Cyprian De duodecim abusivis 
saeculi and Jonas of Orleans’ 9th-century De institutione regia through to the later 
middle ages, it was, following Exodus 22: 22 (see also Isaias 1: 17; Jeremias 7: 6; 
Job 29: 25), a commonplace of Christian political theory that rulers and knights 
should defend the rights of orphans and widows.12 
                                                            
11 All Biblical references are from the Douay-Rheims version, Baltimore, John Murphy, 1899; 
reprinted Rockford, Illinois, Tan Books, 1971. 
12 “Pseudo-Cyprianus de xii abusivis saeculi”, Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der 
altchristlichen Literatur, ed. S. Hellman, 34:1, Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs, 1910, p. 51; Jonas of 
Orleans, Le métier de roi (De institutione regia), ed. A. Dubreucq , Paris, Editions de Cerf, 1995,  
p. 188, 200, 214. For later sources, see S. H. Rigby, Wisdom and Chivalry: Chaucer’s Knight’s 
Tale and Medieval Political Theory, Leiden, Brill, 2009, p. 189. 
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Thus, far from Christine’s insistence that superiors should respect their inferiors 
and that rulers should protect the most vulnerable in society representing a late-
medieval shift towards a more reciprocal and egalitarian view of the body politic, such 
claims merely repeated the arguments with which she was familiar from John of 
Salisbury’s mid-12th-century Policraticus and Giles of Rome’s 13th-century De 
regimine principum. Indeed, a stress on reciprocity was inherent in the very notion of 
the body politic and had always been one of the main aspects of the social and political 
order which the organic analogy had been meant to express. After all, the body had long 
functioned as a metaphor for the “harmonious unity in plurality” which medieval 
metaphysics inherited as its ontological ideal from the ancient world and which 
philosophers and moralists saw as the correct model for the organization of human 
society. Following St Paul and Augustine, and invoking the authority of Aristotle, 
thinkers such as Aquinas and Giles of Rome argued that the perfection of the world 
required the existence of diverse kinds of things each of which performed its own 
particular task for the benefit of the wider whole of which it is a part, with the body 
being a classic case in point (GKP: 59, 193, 234, 285, 295, 297-301; LGR: 167, 213, 
266, 271).13 When applied to human communities – whether to the “Church” or to 
particular kingdoms – the organic analogy was inevitably used to highlight the need for 
a variety of estates and occupations, all of which, like the body’s diverse members, had 
to fulfill their own particular functions and to co-exist harmoniously with their fellows, 
with each reciprocally exchanging its services with those of the others.14 These ties of 
interdependence and reciprocity constrained even the head of the body politic. As John 
of Salisbury argued, if the ruler’s position of command over his subjects entitled him to 
“great privileges”, he should also seek the “utility” of all within the community, putting 
the public welfare even before that of his own children. He therefore advocated that the 
superior members of the body politic “should devote themselves to the inferiors” and 
even argued that Plutarch’s supposed Institutio Trajani (from which he claimed to 
have taken the metaphor of the body politic, although most modern scholars see this 
work as actually being John’s own invention) had taught that, in public policy, 
“what is to the advantage of the humbler people, that is, the multitude, is to be 
followed; for the fewer always submit to the more numerous” (Pol: III: 15 (p. 25); 
IV: 1 (p. 28); IV: 5 (p. 40); IV: 6 (p. 41); IV: 11 (p. 58-9); VI: 20 (p. 126)).15 
                                                            
13 A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, New York, Harper 
and Brothers, 1960, p. 67, 76-77; E. Grant, Planets, Stars and Orbs: the Medieval Cosmos, 1200-
1687, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 148-49; Aristotle, “On the Universe”, 
The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume I, ed. J. Barnes, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1984, 392a-b, 396a-b, 397a, 399a-b; Aristotle, “Politics”, in The Politics and the Constitution of 
Athens, ed. S. Everson, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, II: 5 (p. 37); 
Augustine, Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans, trans. H. Bettenson, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1972, V: 11 (p. 196); XII: 4-5 (p. 475-77); XII: 23 (p. 503); XII: 28 (p. 508); XIX:11-13 
(p. 865-71); XXII:18 (p. 1059); XXII:24 (p. 1073-74). 
14 G. R. Owst, Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England, Oxford, Blackwell, 1966; second 
edition, p. 557-63. 
15 Christine, like Jean Gerson, followed John of Salisbury in ascribing the Institutio Trajani to 
Plutarch (CLE: 5493; BBP/LCP: I: 1; II: 1; III: 9; III: 11; Jean Gerson, “Pour la réforme du 
royaume”, in Jean Gerson: Œuvres Complètes, Vol. 7:2, ed. P. Glorieux , Paris, Desclée et Cie, 
1968 p. 1146). 
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Thus, even before the translation of Aristotle’s Politics into Latin, the influence 
of Cicero’s De officiis meant that it was a political commonplace that the ruler should 
devote himself to the common good of his subjects and that such virtue provided the 
touchstone of legitimate government.16 John of Salisbury, for instance, had 
differentiated between the true prince and the tyrant not simply in terms of whether the 
ruler governed by law or by his own arbitrary will but also on the basis of whether the 
ruler put himself “at the service” of his people and so looked after the “entire 
community” (Pol: IV: 1 (p. 28); VIII: 17 (190-1)). From the 13th century onwards, the 
same idea was frequently expressed in terms of the Aristotelian distinction between the 
three “true” forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy and “constitutional 
government”), where the rulers pursued the “common interest” of the community, and 
the three “perverted” forms (tyranny, oligarchy and democracy ) in which they sought 
their own “private interest” (GKP: 20, 55, 309, 325, 328, 372; LGR: 17, 43, 300-2, 
347).17 Rather than medieval notions of authority and power being based on a 
conception of antagonistic, independent individuals competitively seeking to impose 
power on each other, a conception which Christine supposedly transcended with a 
vision of “interdependence and cooperation”, reciprocity and cooperation within a 
hierarchical division of labour were actually the conventional ideals of medieval social 
and political ideology as set out in mirrors for princes, even if, inevitably, the reality 
was very different from the ideal.18 
 
Hierarchy within the body politic 
Yet, if Christine, like earlier political theorists, used the metaphor of the body 
politic to teach that all members of society should perform their services for the benefit 
of their fellows, there was no reason why this emphasis on co-operation and mutuality 
should have precluded an understanding of the polity which was based on inequality 
and on the exclusion of most members of society from an active political role within it. 
Thus, while we today might see an emphasis on political “mutuality and 
interdependence” as being at odds with “hierarchy and subordination” for medieval 
thinkers, including Christine these principles were perfectly compatible.19 After all, as 
theologians and philosophers such as Augustine, Aquinas and Giles of Rome had 
                                                            
16 Cicero, On Duties, ed. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1991, I: 22 (p. 9-10); I: 31 (p. 13); I: 51-63 (p. 22-6); I: 85-6 (p. 33-4); III: 21-31 (p. 108-
11). See also Seneca, “De clementia”, I, iii: 2- I, iv: 3, in Seneca, Moral Essays, ed. J. W. Basore, 
3 volumes, London, Heinemann, 1928-1935, Volume I. 
17 Aristotle, “Politics”, III: 7 (p. 71-2); IV: 2 (p. 93); M. S. Kempshall, The Common Good in Late 
Medieval Political Thought , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), passim; C. R. Sherman, 
Imaging Aristotle: Verbal and Visual Representation in Fourteenth-Century France, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1995, p. 184-97. 
18 Brabant and Brint, “Identity and Difference in Christine de Pizan’s Cité des dames”, p. 211, 
215-7. 
19 K. L. Forhan, The Political Theory of Christine de Pizan , Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002, p. 50; K. 
Langdon Forhan, “Polycracy, Obligation and Revolt: the Body Politic in John of Salisbury and 
Christine de Pizan”, in Brabant, Politics, Gender and Genre,  p. 33-52, at p. 35, 38; K. L. Forhan, 
“Salisburian Stakes: the Uses of ‘Tyranny’ in John of Salisbury’s Policraticus”, History of 
Political Thought, 11, 1990, p. 397-407, at p. 407; Nederman, “‘The Expanding Body Politic”, 
p. 388-91. 
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traditionally presented equality as being synonymous with simple uniformity, it 
followed that they saw the self-evident need for diversity within the body – and within 
the body politic – as also implying the need for inequality between its members (DRP: 
III, i: viii-ix; GKP: 59, 193, 234, 285, 295, 297-301, 411; LGR: 46, 167, 213, 271, 
391).20 This hierarchical understanding of the body (and of its application to society) 
had a number of sources. One was the Pauline idea of Christ as the “head” of the 
Church and of the Church as the members of His body (Ephesians 1: 22-23, 4: 15-16; 
Colossians 1: 18, 2: 10, 19), an image which was commonplace throughout the Middle 
Ages. Equally familiar were the Pauline texts teaching that the husband is “the head of 
the wife, as Christ is the head of the church” (I Corinthians 11: 3; Ephesians 5: 23). 
Another source for the conception of the members of the body as being hierarchically 
related was ancient and medieval physiology and medicine where although the bladder, 
anus and intestines might be seen as being indispensable to the body’s operations, this 
did not mean that they could usurp pride of place from the more “noble” members such 
as the head or heart. Medieval writers also inherited a hierarchical conception of the 
body from Aristotle who had taught that the rule of the soul and of reason over the body 
and the passions was “natural and expedient whereas the equality of the two or the rule 
of the inferior is always hurtful”, and who had used this mutually beneficial but unequal 
relationship as an analogy with which to justify the superiority of humans over animals, 
men over women, and masters over their slaves.21 
Moreover, for medieval philosophers, the hierarchical nature of the human body 
provided simply one instance of the much broader Aristotelian metaphysical principle 
that rightful order could only be maintained within any object made up of diverse 
elements when a hierarchical ordering was found between its parts and, in particular, 
when one chief part exercised an overall control within it (GKP: 193, 278, 280, 327: 
LGR: 167, 257,-8, 260, 302-3). For instance, in any body made of mixed materials, the 
heavy element of earth has a mastery which means that the object naturally moves 
downwards, towards its rightful place at the centre of the Earth; similarly, within the 
cosmos, the rotation of the primum mobile rules the movements of all the rest of the 
heavens (GKP: 175, 273-4, 327; LGR: 251-3, 302-3).22 When this hierarchical 
perspective was applied to the body politic, it was inevitably used to demonstrate that 
just as the parts of the human body were ranked in terms of their “honour” and of the 
degree of control which they exercised over the other members, so it was inevitable that 
the different estates within society would be ranked hierarchically in terms of their 
economic, political and social status. As John of Salisbury argued, just as nature has 
ordained that the members of the body should be subject to the head in order that “all of 
them may move correctly provided that the will of a sound head is followed”, so the 
prince, as head of the body politic, has “power over all his subjects”, enjoying such a 
primacy that he constitutes “a certain image on earth of the divine majesty” (Pol: IV: 1 
(p. 28), VI: 25 (p. 137)). As a result, it was perfectly possible for thinkers such as John 
of Salisbury to have anticipated Christine de Pizan in expressing a concern for the poor, 
                                                            
20 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 67, 76-77. 
21 Aristotle, “Politics”, I: 5 (p. 16-17), I: 6 (p. 19), VII: 1 (p. 167), VII: 15 (p. 190). See also 
Seneca, “De clementia”, I, iii: 5. 
22 Giles of Rome’s On Ecclesiastical Power, ed. R. W. Dyson, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2004, p. 19, 25-37, 57, 59, 191, 217, 233-43, 259-61, 279-81, 287, 307, 391; Rigby, 
“Aristotle for Aristocrats and Poets”, p. 267-73. 
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in a stress on the need for the ruler to provide protection for his subjects and in 
presenting of each member of society as being “reciprocally” linked to all the others 
and yet still to have remained wedded to a head-orientated conception of the body 
politic (Pol: VI: 20 (p. 126); VI: 25 (p. 137)). While it is the duty of the “superior 
members” of the body politic to devote themselves to the well-being of their inferiors 
and to seek what is to the advantage of the humble, inferiors, in their turn, “must serve 
superiors” and respect their supremacy and all the members of the body must “subject 
themselves to the head”, i.e., to the prince, who is “a sort of deity on earth”, or at least 
an “image of the deity”, who should be “loved, venerated and respected” so that an 
attack on him is like an act of sacrilege. It was not that the idea of the head as the 
commander of the rest of the body was necessarily at odds with that of its being the 
body’s servant but rather that the head served the rest of the body by carrying out its 
function of commanding the body’s movements and operations (Pol: IV: 7 (p. 48-9); V: 
15 (p. 96); VI: 20 (p. 126); VI: 25 (p. 137); VI: 26 (p. 140); VI: 28 (p. 142); VIII: 17 (p. 
191)). 
Thus, when Christine de Pizan insisted that the poor should be paid for their 
produce, that they should not be disdained by their superiors, that all the members of the 
body politic were bound by reciprocal duties, and that the function of the prince was to 
serve the interests of his subjects, this certainly did not mean that she was breaking with 
the hierarchical conception of the body politic. On the contrary, in doing so she was 
rehearsing opinions which had been expressed 250 years previously by John of 
Salisbury. Indeed, to make her point Christine followed John in citing the fable of 
how the limbs of the body futilely and self-destructively complained about having to 
serve its belly in order not only to warn the prince of the troubles which would result 
if he demanded more from his subjects than they could bear but also to depict the 
evils which arise when subjects do not show “love, reverence and obedience” to 
their prince: “In such discord, they all perish together” (Pol: VI: 24 (p. 135-6); 
BBP/LCP: III: 1).23 Accordingly, while Christine, like John of Salisbury and Giles of 
Rome, reminded princes of the negative consequences (not least to themselves) of their 
own moral failings and of the need to win the love of their subjects by their treatment of 
them, she still insisted on the necessity for subjects to show obedience to their rulers 
(TCL: I: 7; I: 16; LTV: I: 8; I: 17). It was not that Christine advocated reciprocity 
despite her stress on social subordination but rather that she justified subordination 
precisely in terms of the reciprocal benefits which it brought, in terms of justice and 
protection, to those who deferentially accepted their place in the social hierarchy. After 
all, if ideology offered only a one-sided obedience and patient suffering on the part of 
the ruled, it would hardly have functioned very effectively as a justification of the 
existing social order in the first place. 
That Christine, like her predecessors, saw no necessary tension between 
reciprocity and inequality within the body politic is evident in her Livre du corps de 
policie, a work which is unambiguously pro-hierarchical in its political theory and in 
its use of the organic analogy. Just as John of Salisbury had done, Christine here 
equates the prince with the head of the body because he is “or should be sovereign” 
and so should direct the “external deeds” of the limbs of the body. Whilst the prince 
                                                            
23 Christine was also familiar with the fable from the translation of Valerius Maximus by Hesdin 
and Gonesse. See Valerius Maximus, Simon de Hesdin and Nicolas de Gonesse, Facta et 
dicta memorabilia, fol. 99v; Cicero, On Duties, I: 85 (p. 33); III: 32 (p. 111); III: 22 (p. 108). 
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should love his subjects, be gentle and kind to them, and ensure that they receive 
justice, he should also be “obeyed and feared by right and reason”, as is appropriate 
to the majesty of a prince, there being no “true justice” where a prince is not feared 
(BBP/LCP: I: 1; I: 12; I: 16; I: 19; I: 21; IIII: 1).While Christine does not follow 
those medieval philosophers and poets, including John of Salisbury (Pol: VI: 25 (p. 
137); VI: 26 (p. 142); VIII: 17 (p.191)), who described the prince as actually being 
an “image” or “likeness” of God, she nonetheless argued that the prince had been 
chosen by God for the burden of office, one in which he was, as in the title 
traditionally reserved for emperors but which Charles VI had adopted in 1385, 
“vicar of God” on earth (BBP/LCP: I: 7; TCL: I: 6; LTV: I: 7).24 Accordingly, she 
taught that everyone should be obedient not only to God’s commandments but also to 
the laws of the land and to the commands of their sovereign or superior. Thus, while, 
her Livre des trois vertus advised the princess to intercede with her husband on behalf 
of his people if they complained to her of excessive taxation, Christine also counseled 
the princess to remind her husband’s subjects of the need “always to be loyal, good and 
obedient towards their lord”. She advised a similar obedience of barons to the king, of 
wives to their husbands, of nuns to their abbesses and prioresses, and of servants and 
labourers to their masters, mistresses and employers (TCL: I: 7-8; I: 8; II: 13; III: 9; III: 
12; LTV: I: 8-9; II: 13; III; 9; III: 12). Christine’s outlook thus formed part of a long 
tradition of medieval political thought, from Jonas of Orleans through Aquinas and 
Giles of Rome to Jean Gerson and Thomas Hoccleve, in which obedience was seen 
not in terms of servile subordination but as an aspect of individual virtue and of 
rightful social order (DRP: III, ii: xxxiv; GKP: 387-9; LGR: 364-6).25 
However, Christine not only recommended subjects and inferiors to be patient 
and obedient towards their rulers and superiors as a matter of individual virtue but 
also, in the Livre du corps de policie, explicitly advocated hierarchical rule and 
rejected egalitarian or popular government on the grounds of constitutional 
principle. While recognizing the diversity of political institutions and customs to be 
found in different lands, including elected emperors, hereditary kings, and a variety 
of types of elected rulers, she argued, on the supposed authority of Aristotle’s 
Politics, that “the polity of one is best, that is governance and rule by one. Rule by a 
few is still good … but rule by the many is too large to be good, because of the 
diversity of opinions and desires”. Where rulers were elected by the people, the 
choice was often made “more by will than by reason”, with the rulers being chosen 
and then deposed “by caprice”. For Christine, such government was “not beneficial 
where it is the custom, as in Italy in many places”. While in some cities “the 
common people govern and each year a number of persons are installed from each 
trade”, Christine argued that “such governance is not profitable at all for the republic 
and also it does not last very long once begun, nor is there peace in and around it”, 
citing Bologna (her father’s native city) as an instance of the evils which resulted 
                                                            
24 Rigby, Wisdom and Chivalry, p. 199-201; G. Zeller, “Les rois de France candidats à l’empire. 
Essai sur l’idéologie impériale en France”, Revue Historique, 173, 1934, p. 273-311, at 
p. 309. 
25 Gerson, “Pour la réforme du royaume” p. 1140, 1147, 1158-9; J. M. Blythe, Ideal Government 
and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992, 
p. 48, 83-4; Rigby, “Aristotle for Aristocrats and Poets”, p. 300-302. For references to primary 
and secondary sources, see Rigby, Wisdom and Chivalry, p. 195-8. 
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from such popular government.26 Her work thus stands in a long tradition of 
medieval political theory which presented peace as being brought about by a 
universal monarch ruling over the world, a tradition with which Christine may have 
been familiar from Dante’s De monarchia and which, more specifically, was 
associated with contemporary prophecies that Charles VI would conquer Europe, be 
crowned as emperor and then lead a crusade to Jerusalem, prophecies which were 
also invoked in the work of Philippe de Mézières and Honoré Bouvet.27 
Like other thinkers who saw monarchy as the best form of government, 
Christine inevitably stressed the need for the prince to possess virtue and to acquire 
a knowledge of the wise doctrines of thinkers such as Aristotle and Boethius if the 
common good was to be achieved (GKP: 341; LGR: 319; BDAC: I: V (p. 19): MF: 
5827-46).28 In particular, the ruler needed the prudence which allowed such learning to 
be applied to the realities of government, prudence being located, as Christine said 
Livre des fais et bonnes meurs, in the part of the human soul from which “advient 
practique, qui apartient aux choses ouvrables” (LFBM II: 21). Nevertheless, Christine’s 
stress on the ruler’s need for “applied wisdom” by no means involved a re-invention or 
re-imagining of the reinventing or reimagining of the notion of the ideal sovereign.29 On 
the contrary, the ideal of kingly prudence had been set out by Aristotelian political 
theorists long before Christine’s day and a very similar discussion of prudence to that 
offered by Christine is to be found in Giles of Rome’s account of this virtue in the De 
regimine principum, including his location of prudence in the intellectus practicus 
within the soul and his emphasis on the need for the ruler’s wisdom to find its 
application in actual practice (GKP: 25, 37, 51-3, 117-20, 149, 256, 328-9, 332, 340-51, 
390-1; LGR: 21, 39-41, 98-101, 133, 233, 302-3, 310, 319-28, 368-9). Aristotle himself 
had classified knowledge as “theoretical”, “poetical” and “practical” and had further 
                                                            
26 It is not clear which specific episode in the city’s turbulent history Christine had in mind. 
For references, see Carol Lansing, “Bologna”, Medieval Italy: an Encyclopedia, Volume I. ed. 
C. Kleinhenz, New York, Roputledge, 2004, p. 134-8. See also Cecelia M. Ady, The 
Bentivoglio of Bologna: A Study in Despotism, London, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 1-
10. 
27 G. Mombello, “Quelques aspects de la pensée politique de Christine de Pizan d’après ses 
œuvres publiées”, Culture et politique en France à l’époque de l’humanisme et de la 
Renaissance. ed. F. Simone, Torino, Accademia delle Scienze 1974, p. 43-153, at p. 41-2, 96, 
149; S. J. Hindman, Christine de Pizan’s Epistre Othéa: Painting and Politics at the Court of 
Charles VI, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1986, p. 145-6, 169-81; Dante, 
Monarchy and Three Political Letters, ed. D. Nicholl and C. Hardie, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1954, I: V-10; K. Green, “Introduction”, in Christine de Pizan, The Book of Peace, 
p. 1-31, at p. 25-7; Autrand, Christine de Pizan, p. 341; Zeller, “Les roi de France candidats à 
l’empire”, p. 298-300, 307-8; M. Chaume, “Une prophétie relative à Charles VI”, Revue de 
Moyen Âge Latin, 3, 1947, p. 27-42; M. Reeves, The Influence of Prophecy in the Later 
Middle Ages: a Study in Joachimism, Oxford, Clarendon, 1969, p. 321-31. For a contrasting 
view, see B. A. Carroll, “The Causes of War and the Quest for Peace”, in Hicks, Au champ des 
escriptures, p. 337-58, at p. 357 and B. A. Carroll, “Christine de Pizan and the Origins of 
Peace Theory”, Women Writers and the Early Modern British Political Tradition, ed. H. M. 
Smith, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 22-39, at p. 33-9. 
28 Rigby, Wisdom and Chivalry, p. 12. 
29 D. Delogu, Theorizing the Ideal Sovereign: The Rise of the French Vernacular Royal 
Biography, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2008, p. 173-182. 
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sub-divided practical knowledge into ethics, economics and politics, i.e., rule of the self, 
of the household and of the polity, with his categories being adopted by medieval 
Aristotelians such as Latini and Gower.30 
Nor, given Christine’s definition of princely prudence as a means of 
achieving the common good, should her work be seen as anticipating Machiavelli in 
appealing “not to a ruler’s vision of the good life but to his self-interest”, in contrast 
with earlier writers, such as John of Salisbury and Giles of Rome, for whom the pursuit 
of self-interest had been the hallmark of the tyrant.31 Firstly, Christine’s awareness of 
the need for pragmatism on the part of the prince was hardly original. Giles of Rome, 
for instance, had followed Seneca and John of Salisbury (Pol: III: 3 (p. 17)) in 
recognizing that, by nature, humans are inclined to love themselves and to seek their 
own profit and good.32 It was thus the immoderate pursuit of his own interests at the 
expense of the common good which distinguished the tyrant from the virtuous ruler 
(GKP: 20, 55, 70, 76, 100, 119-20, 309, 325, 328, 330, 372; LGR: 17, 43, 61, 100, 300-
1, 304, 307, 347). Secondly, while emphasising that political prudence was a form of 
“practique”, Christine associated such practical wisdom not with a Machiavellian 
amorality but with discretion and virtue since such prudence was grounded in the 
human capability to “distinguish good and evil” and was a means of achieving 
justice and reason: virtue and competence were thus one (BP: I: 4-7; BBP/LCP: I: 6; 
MF: 7721-83).33 Christine’s thought can thus be located within the mainstream of 
medieval political theory in which good government was thought to be achieved not 
through the reform of political institutions but rather by the ethical self-rule of the 
prince and within which social and political problems were conceived of in moral terms 
and thus as requiring moral solutions. 
If Christine’s hierarchical political outlook is evident in her defence of rule 
by a virtuous prince as the best form of polity, it is equally prominent in her 
discussion in the Livre du corps de policie of the government of individual towns 
within the realm. Here she argues that burghers (old city families with a surname 
and family coat of arms) and wealthy merchants should ensure the good government 
of the town whereas the “humble people” (“le menu peuple”) who “do not 
commonly have great prudence in words or even in deeds that concern politics … 
should not meddle in the ordinances established by princes”. If the common people 
are aggrieved in some way with the prince or the burdens which he imposes on 
them, the burghers, wealthy citizens and merchants should “not allow them to do 
anything” for themselves, “for that leads to the destruction of cities and of 
countries”, but should send some of the “wisest and most discreet” from amongst 
                                                            
30 John Gower, “Confessio Amantis” , The English Works of John Gower, ed. G. C. Macaulay, 
two volumes; Early English Text Society, e.s. 81, 82, 1900, 1901, Volume II, VII: 23-202, 1522-
44, 1641-99, and see the notes to these lines. Latini actually divides knowledge into three 
forms: theoretical, practical (including ethics, economics and politics) and logic (Brunetto 
Latini,  The Book of the Treasure (Li livres dou tresor), ed. P. Barette and S. Baldwin,  New York, 
Garland, 1993, p. x-xi, 2-5). 
31 Forhan, The Political Theory of Christine de Pizan, p. 100-8, 164-5; Aristotle, “Politics”, III: 7. 
32 Seneca, Ad Lucilium, Epistulae Morales, ed. R. M. Gummere, three volumes; London, 
Heinemann, 1917-1920, Volume II, 82: 15-16. See also Aristotle, Nicomeachean Ethics, I: ii, 8. 
33 Forhan, The Political Theory of Christine de Pizan, p. 126; K. Green, “On Translating Christine 
de Pizan as a Philosopher”’, in Green and Mews, Healing the Body Politic, p. 117-37. 
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themselves to make the popular grievances known to the prince or his council. They 
should, however, beware of “foolishly complaining” about the policies of the prince 
and his council and instead should assume the “good intentions” of their rulers even 
when their purposes are not apparent. The “wise should teach the simple and 
ignorant to keep quiet about those things which are not their domains and from 
which great danger can come and no benefit”. Appealing to the authority of the 
Book of Exodus, where it is commanded that “you will not complain about great 
rulers nor curse the princes of the people” (Exodus 22: 28), and to Solomon’s 
warning to subjects not to “betray the king in your thought” (Ecclesiastes 10: 20), 
Christine concluded that “no subject ought to conspire against his lord” (BBP/LCP: 
III: 6-7).34 In the light of these passages from the Livre du corps de policie, it is 
difficult to interpret Christine’s political thought as representing an anti-hierarchical 
shift in political theory, as exhibiting any egalitarian sensibility, or as involving a view 
of the ruler as simply being the servant rather than the commander of his people. On the 
contrary, this work was explicitly unsympathetic to the “many” enjoying any active 
or autonomous role in political life, let alone to them becoming the dominant 
element within the polity or backing up their case by armed force. Similarly, in the 
Mutacion de fortune (1403) and the Livre de l’advision Cristine, Christine had 
attacked those in the lower orders who would not know their place as troublemakers, 
as the “worms of the earth”, as an “abominable, poisonous mass of vermin”, and as 
like a “plague” on the land (MF: 4071-4128; LAC/VCP: I: 10). Christine’s attitude 
to the poor was thus a mixture of compassion and fear: compassion when they 
suffered, but fear when they acted on their own initiative to do anything about it. If 
the people enjoyed a “primacy” in Christine’s definition of good government, they 
did so in their capacity as the object of the ruler’s actions in his defence of the 
common good rather than as active political agents in their own right.35 
However, if Christine had always been hostile to government by the people 
then the experience of the Burgundian-backed Cabochian Revolt of 1413, a Parisian 
rising involving popular violence in which Armagnac nobles were killed or imprisoned 
and ordinances restricting royal privileges were issued, seems to have made her 
particularly anxious about the dangers of popular rule. Thus, her Livre de paix, written 
after the revolt, describes the common people as “changeable” and as “led on by 
sensuality and scarcely checked by reason”. If human nature is in general “inclined 
toward all the vices, when discretion and reason do not intervene”, such reason was 
particularly weak in the common people “because they do not receive much 
instruction in virtue or in how to tell good from evil” so that many of them are “little 
better than beasts, as far as reason is concerned” and have “ever been, through their 
very nature, inclined to go astray through foolish credulity and bad counsel”, with 
even poverty, “for the most part”, failing to remove their pride. Christine thus 
described those members of the lower class who had taken part in the Cabochian 
uprising and who aspired to have a role in government as “fools” and as the 
members of a “base rabble” who were more suited to spending time in “low taverns” 
than to governing others. She mocked the perversity, foolishness, evil and wilfulness 
of these “vile and wretched people”, the “low born and bestial rabble” with their 
                                                            
34 Christine here, as elsewhere, seems to depart from the literal text of the Vulgate. 
35 S. J. Dudash, “’Christine de Pizan and the ‘menu people’”, Speculum, 78, 2003, p. 788-31, at 
p. 796-8. 
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“mad government” and “diabolical” assemblies: if they followed each other like 
sheep, they also became worse than wild boars in their fury, showing no respect for 
prince or princess, lord or master as they murder and pillage. The leaders of such 
evildoing should not be spared but punished according to the law (BP: II: 1; II: 2; 
III: 7, 11).36 
Attempting to correct the “madness” of those tempted to “rise up in rebellion 
against their superiors”, Christine taught that since God “dislikes dissension by 
subjects against their superiors and princes” and has regularly punished the pride of 
those who “want to climb higher than they should”, he has ordained that the people 
of all nations should be “humble” beneath the rule of their “superiors”. As was 
shown by God’s punishment of those who were guilty of “murmuring and sedition” 
against Moses, which included killing “fourteen thousand men on the spot” 
(Numbers 16: 41-9), it was “always a bad course for the people to conspire against 
their rulers or their royal estate”. Thus while the common people, whose “trade and 
labour are necessary to the realm” should not be “downtrodden or unreasonably 
burdened”, Christine remained suspicious of allowing the people any political role. 
Lacking in reflection, the common people were prone to hastiness, to “commotion 
and tumult” and to complaining that they were “badly governed and would be better 
so”. They should not be elevated to responsibility or rank greater than that which 
belonged to them: “They should not have authority of any office, nor prerogative of 
any government of city or town – things that belong to worthy burgers from old 
families”. Men of the artisan class who had done nothing but work by their hands 
could scarcely be expected to have acquired the knowledge which made people “fit 
to be placed in government”. They would not have “mixed with jurists or experts in 
matters of law and justice”, they would not have “seen honour”, “know what 
intelligence is” nor “have learnt how to speak in ordered way with fine and clear 
arguments” (BP: III: 2, 7, 10, 11, 21).  
While allowing that, “even among simple artisans”, there were “very good 
people who would never participate in such disturbances”, Christine concluded once 
more that “civic office is not suitable for the populace”. Appealing again to the example 
of Bologna, Christine argued that rule by the people in the contemporary world did not 
lead to good government or to peace. In opposition to those who cited the examples of 
ancient Rome or the Venice of her own day as praiseworthy instances of government by 
the common people “without a lord”, she claimed that these were actually instances of 
rule by what were, in effect, “nobles” since these cities were governed by “ancient 
lineages of worthy burghers” who would “by no means admit any of the common 
people to their councils”. As in her Livre du corps de policie, Christine once more 
invoked the authority of Aristotle to buttress her claim that no wise man would approve 
of “government by the common people” with the Philosopher having affirmed that rule 
by the many in a country or city “is a confused thing”. Similarly Cataline had shown 
that “the poor  – the common people  – always envy the rich and because of this they 
are quick to rise up and exalt the wicked, wanting new lords and revolutions. Since they 
are never satisfied no matter how good their rulers are, they constantly want the city’s 
government changed”. Likewise, the Cabochian rising had demonstrated that the poor 
                                                            
36 Gower, “Vox clamantis”, Book I, in The Major Latin Works of John Gower, ed. E. W. 
Stockton, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1962.   
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desired civil war so as to be able to “overrun the rich”. To give authority to such people 
would thus be “no different from giving licence to robbers and murderers” and it would 
be great foolishness for the prince “to allow the common people to arm themselves”. 
Thus, if the prince lacked sufficient men-at-arms from his own country, he should hire 
foreign mercenaries so as to avoid having to arm the common people amongst whom 
there was “no stability or security” and who were good only for pillaging (BP: III: 12; 
BDAC I: X (p. 27-8); III: VII (p. 152-3)). 
Christine did not, however, apply the same caution when it came to allowing the 
nobles to bear arms even though she admitted that it was actually they who had recently 
been engaged in a civil war whose mutual “slaughter and confusion” were reminiscent 
of the actions of the madman who tore at his own flesh with his teeth and whose feet 
sought to kick his own eyes. On the contrary, she urged that the nobles should be 
trained and armed for war while also reminding them of the need to refrain from the 
internal quarrels which gave the “diabolical common people” the chance to arm 
themselves (BP: III: 13-14). It is hard to see such passages from the third book of the 
Livre de paix as exhibiting a ““populist” orientation”, as involving a “careful and subtle 
focus” on “the people” as part of an attempt to incorporate them “into the political 
decision-making process”, or as advocating “the expansion of the political realm to the 
people”.37 Thus, while Christine was certainly willing to criticise all the classes in the 
France of her day, from the very top of society to the bottom, her specific criticism 
of the princes and the nobles was that they were failing to carry out their political 
duties whereas her criticism of the lower orders was that they presumed to have a 
political role in the first place. 
 
Resistance to the tyrant  
If, as Christine argued, the establishment of peace within the political 
community depended upon the actions of a prince who was individually virtuous and 
who was willing to attend to the counsel of the wise, this inevitably raised the 
enforcement dilemma of what should happen if, in practice, the prince lacked the virtue 
which was required of him or if he refused to listen to good counsel and so lapsed into 
tyranny. There was a tradition of political thought, one which can be traced from 
Cicero, through John of Salisbury (Pol: VIII: 18-21) to Aquinas, Oresme, Gerson 
and others, which taught that it was “lawful and glorious” to resist tyrants.38 Even 
Giles of Rome, who did not positively advocate the deposition of tyrants, had still 
maintained that, since tyranny was illegitimate and unnatural, the tyrant was soon likely 
to face the opposition of the excellent and noble men whom he had sought to destroy 
(GKP: 25, 117-20, 328-9, 332-8, 340-9; LGR: 21, 99-101, 310-16, 319-27).39 When 
judged against this tradition, Christine’s own attitude to tyranny, at least as it appears 
in the Livre du corps de policie, actually seems rather acquiescent. Thus, in arguing 
that subjects should be “humble” and “readily obedient to their lords and rulers”, she 
                                                            
37 Richards, “Bartolo da Sassaferrato as a Possible Source for Christine’s Livre de paix”, p. 84, 88, 
96-7. 
38 For references to other primary and secondary sources, see Rigby, Wisdom and Chivalry, 
p. 183. 
39 Aristotle, “Politics”, III, 17; V: 10;  Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. H. Rackham , 
Ware, Wordsworth Editions, 1996, IV, v: 7. 
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cited the words of St Paul, who had taught that the powers that princes enjoy have 
been ordained by God so that he who resists their power “is recalcitrant or rebellious 
against the command of God”. Similarly, she invoked the authority of St Peter who 
had commanded that subjects and servants should be obedient to their princes and 
masters (Romans 13: 1-2; Titus 3: 1; 1 Peter 2: 13-18). Likewise, Christ himself, in 
teaching that subjects should “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s” and pay 
the taxes required from them, had commanded that, in deed and in word, we should 
“revere and obey lords and princes” (Matthew 17: 24-6; 22: 21). Anticipating the 
objection that the command to obey superior powers rulers only applied in those 
cases where princes were “good”, Christine paraphrased St Peter as saying that even 
when princes were bad (“feussent mauvais”), people should still subject themselves 
to them “for the love of God” (I Peter 2: 13-14, 180; BBP/LCP: III: 3). It is no 
surprise then when her Chemin de long estude lists rebellion alongside famine, 
earthquakes and pestilence as being among the disasters ills which befall the 
sublunary world (CLE: 2149-63) or that her Livre de l’advision Cristine, portrays 
the deposition of the “good king” Richard II of England by his “changeable people” 
as a “dure pestilence” which the king and his realm had suffered (LAC/VCP: III: 11; 
MF: 4541-4554, 23501-23511; LFBM: I: 147-8, 171; AB: XXII).). 
However, while Christine’s Livre du corps de policie advocates unconditional 
submission to the ruler, even a bad one, her Livre de paix adopts a rather different 
position. Here, while still teaching that popular rebellion against the prince or the 
nobles “offends God”, Christine does seem to allow that subjects have some right of 
resistance against a tyrant and his abuses of power. As she said, in defending the rights 
of lords and superiors, she did not advocate that such lords could “trample” on those 
who were subject to their power (BP: III: 4, 7, 10). In general, Christine’s discussion of 
the evils that result from tyranny – not least those which befall the tyrant himself – are 
intended more as a warning to the would-be tyrant rather than as an encouragement to 
the potential tyrannicide. As a result, much of her discussion focuses on the punishment 
which God sends directly to evil princes, such as the “bitter torments of the inner parts” 
and stinking worm-filled sores with which He afflicted the proud Antiochus (2 
Macabees 9: 1-28). She also stressed the suffering which tyrants inflict upon 
themselves, with those who seek to make the world tremble themselves enduring a 
living hell of fear and apprehension. Nonetheless, Christine does also refer approvingly 
to those instances where God worked to punish tyrants indirectly, via human agency. 
Even here, however, many of the cases she cites are actually of those who opposed 
proud, foreign invaders, as when Judith killed Holofernes, the Assyrian general (Judith 
1: 5; 2: 3-4; 3: 13; 6: 2) or when Judas Maccabeus defeated the Syrian leader Seron (1 
Maccabees 3: 13, 23-4), with such resistance to external aggression being a much less 
controversial issue for medieval thinkers than rebellion by subjects against their own 
lord.40 Nevertheless, Christine does also refer to the wretched end of a tyrant such as 
Nero who was overthrown by his own subjects. After all, following Aristotle and 
Cicero, it was a commonplace of medieval political theorists that, in provoking 
opposition from those whom he has wronged, the rule of the tyrant would inevitably be 
the most short-lived form of government (GKP: 25, 118-20, 332-8, 340-9; LGR: 21, 
                                                            
40 Christine gives the story of Judith in her Livre de la cité des dames (BCL: II: 31) and see  her 
view of Joan of Arc as a new (and even greater) Judith in the Ditié de Jehanne d’Arc (DJA: 
217-24). See also Pol: VIII: 20 (p. 207-9).  
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99-101, 310-16, 319-27).41 Christine herself emphasized the “transitory” nature of the 
tyrant’s rule. As she says, confronted with a ruler who is guilty of extorting wrongful 
taxes and who is cruel and unjust, it would hardly be surprising if “le peuple” and “toute 
gent” rebelled against him (BP: II: 4; III: 1, 4-5, 19-21).42 In allowing subjects the 
right, as a last resort, to overthrow a tyrannical ruler, Christine’s position in the Livre de 
paix thus seems to provide a contrast not only with that of a pro-monarchical thinker 
such as Jean Juvénal des Ursins who, in his Tres Crestien, tres hault, tres puissant roy 
(1444), was to teach that the king’s will “est reputé pour loy et raison” and that the king 
“n’a juge que Dieu”, but also with the quietist views which she herself had previously 
set out in the Livre du corps de policie.43 Christine’s work can thus be cited as 
evidence that she was advocate of both of the two opposed responses to royal 
misrule – submission or resistance – which were proposed by the political theorists 
of late medieval France.44 Significantly, it was in the Livre du corps de policie, when 
she was developing the organic analogy at length, that Christine’s political theory was 
at its most hierarchical.  
At first sight, it may seem surprising that Christine should have been more 
sympathetic to resistance to tyranny at the time that she was writing Livre de paix 
than she had been in the Livre du corps de policie. After all, while tyrannicide was 
always likely to be a sensitive issue, it became even more controversial following the 
assassination, in 1407, of Louis of Orléans, brother of Charles VI, on the orders of his 
cousin, John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, an act for which the duke was pardoned 
by the king in the following year, the murder having been defended in a treatise by Jean 
Petit as an act of tyrannicide.45 In such circumstances, one might have expected 
Christine to have been more cautious in her views about the right of resistance to tyrants 
in the Livre de paix (1412-13) than she had been in the Livre du corps de policie, which 
had been completed before Louis’s assassination.46 In fact, as Autrand has argued, 
Christine’s new stance on tyranny may have been the result of her hostile response 
to Louis’s assassination and to the Burgundian-backed Cabochian rising so that, 
ironically, the duke of Burgundy, having justified his actions on the grounds of 
tyrannicide, was now himself implicitly cast by Christine in the role of the tyrant 
                                                            
41 Aristotle, “Politics”, V: 10; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV, v: 7; Cicero, On Duties, II: 
23 (p. 71); Gerson, “Pour la réforme du royaume”, p. 1159-60; J.-M. Mehl, “Le roi de l’échiquier: 
approche du mythe royal à la fin du moyen âge”, Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religeuses, 
58, 1978, p. 145-61, at p. 157. 
42 See also T. van Hemelryck, “Description of the Manuscripts”, in Green et al,. The Book of 
Peace,  p.41-52, at p. 45-7. 
43 Les écrits politiques de Jean Juvénal des Ursins, ed. P. S. Lewis, 3 volumes; Paris, Klincksieck, 
1978-93, Volume II, p. 152-3. 
44 P. S. Lewis, Later Medieval France: the Polity, London, Macmillan, 1968, p. 87-101; B. 
Guenée, States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe, Oxford, Blackwell, 1985, p. 85-8. Guenée 
identifies a similar ambiguity in the thought of Gerson (Ibid., p. 85, 88). 
45 The duke’s pardon was later withdrawn and Petit’s work was publicly burned although this 
occurred after the writing of the Livre de paix (R. Vaughan, John the Fearless: the Growth of 
Burgundian Power, London, Longmans, 1966, p. 44-8, 69-74, 196, 210-12; Autrand, Charles 
VI, p. 349-66). 
46 Christine herself never explicitly refers to the assassination in any of her works (Autrand, 
Christine de Pizan, p. 285). 
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who could legitimately be opposed.47 It would thus seem that political partisanship 
led Christine to abandon the principle of submission even to the bad prince which 
she had set out at length in the Livre du corps de policie, demonstrating that, as 
Wallace has argued, rather than being concerned to produce a timeless statement of 
principle, works of medieval political theory were also often intended “to intervene in 
the specific struggle of a specific secular or religious ruler against a specific enemy at a 
particular moment”.48 Nevertheless, although Christine may have adopted a new 
theoretical stance on tyranny in the Livre de paix, she once more went out of her 
way, as she had in the Livre du corps de policie, to remind the people of 
contemporary France that, in practice, they themselves did not have any grounds for 
rebelling against their rulers. On the contrary, they should be grateful that they had 
benefited from the rule of monarchs who had treated them gently and lovingly and who 
had governed “without tyranny” (BBP/LCP: III: 2; BP: III: 10; see also AB: XLIX). 
 
“Ascending”, “descending” and “mixed” forms of authority  
For Christine, as for John of Salisbury or Giles of Rome, the opposite form of 
government to tyranny was not one which was egalitarian or democratic but rather 
one which was based on the rule of a prince who was individually wise and virtuous. 
Indeed, given her emphasis on the evils of popular government in the Livre du corps 
de policie and the Livre de paix (BBP/LCP: III: 2; BP: III: 11-12),  Christine seems 
even more committed to the necessity of an hierarchical system than were some of the 
other exponents of what Ullmann characterized as a “descending” or “theocratic” 
concept of political authority, in which power flows downwards, ultimately from God, 
let alone when compared to those who favoured an “ascending” or “populist” 
conception of political authority in which the ruler was seen as responsible to the 
political community which could restrain his power and might even elect him to 
office.49 While Ullmann’s typology can be criticised in a number of ways, the basic 
distinction which he drew between those medieval theorists who saw the ruler as 
superior to the political community and those who emphasised the constraints placed 
on the ruler by his subjects does remain a useful one.50 Giles of Rome, for instance, 
expressed this distinction in terms of the contrast between “regal” rule, in which the 
king takes counsel from others but makes the laws according to his own will, and 
“political” government, where the ruler is subject to law made by the citizens (GKP: 
190-1, 213, 326; LGR: 165-6, 190-1, 301). Giles himself favoured “regal” rule and was 
particularly suspicious of the political role of the “common people” whom he regarded 
as being prone to pursuing sensual pleasures rather than the true felicity of virtue. Yet 
                                                            
47 Autrand, Christine de Pizan, p. 271-4, 302-4, 356. 
48 D. Wallace, Chaucerian Polity: Absolutist Lineages and Associational Forms in England and 
Italy, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 3. 
49 W. Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages  London, Methuen, 
1961, p. 20-1, 31-79; A. Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, p. 125-6; Nederman, “Body Politics”, p. 66. 
50 For critiques of Ullmann, see F. Oakley, “Celestial Hierarchies Revisited: Walter Ullmann's 
Vision of Medieval Politics”, Past and Present, 60, 1973, p. 3-48; C. J. Nederman, Lineages of 
European Political Thought: Explorations Along the Medieval/Modern Divide from John of 
Salisbury to Hegel, Washington, Catholic University of America Press, 2009, p. 3-12. 
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even the pro-monarchical Giles still followed the Philosopher and Aquinas in seeing not 
only government by the one or by the few (“monarchy” and “aristocracy”) as being 
rightful forms of rule, provided that they sought the common good, but also 
government by the many (the policia). While it may be more difficult for many people 
to attain moral excellence than it is for one man or for a few, rule by the many, such as 
that found in the case of the Italian city-states in which the people chose the rulers, 
officials and judges and had the right to assent to laws so that there were “as many lords 
as there are people”, was nonetheless a valid form of government provided that the 
rulers did not simply pursue their own private interests (GKP: 190-1, 325-9; LGR: 165-
6, 300-6).51 By contrast, while Christine, in lecturing the artisan class about the need to 
eschew “lechery in taverns and the luxuries [‘friandises’] they use in Paris”, echoed 
Giles of Rome’s comments about the tendency of the common people to value the 
delectation of the senses rather than the felicity of the soul, she was, in her rejection of 
the legitimacy of government by the many  as “too large  to be good”, actually even less 
open than this arch-proponent of the “descending” view of political authority had been to 
the possibility of rule by the many (GKP: 16, 281; LGR: 262; BBP/LCP: III: 2; III: 9). 
Inevitably, if Christine was less sympathetic to popular government than a 
pro-monarchical writer such as Giles of Rome, the nature of her outlook seem even 
more clear-cut when set against the views of those medieval theorists who developed 
an “ascending” concept of political authority. For instance, Brunetto Latini noted the 
varieties of lordship which existed in the world and explicitly defended election to 
office for a set term by the “wise men” of a city as one of the forms of government 
which enjoyed divine approval and which provided a means of obtaining the common 
good of the community.52 Likewise, whereas Christine cited Bologna as an instance of 
the evils of popular government, Ptolemy of Lucca’s preferred mode of government in 
his De regimine principum (c. 1300) seems to be based on that found in contemporary 
Italian city-states in which the rulers were elected for short periods of time, were, in 
theory, constrained by the laws which the community had laid down and were subject 
to some form of popular scrutiny.53 Similarly, Marsilius of Padua, saw the authority of 
the ruler as being derived from the “legislator”, i.e., from “the whole body of the 
citizens, or the weightier part thereof”, with the citizens having the power to make laws, 
to correct the ruler “and even to depose him, if this be expedient for the common 
benefit” and so defended the superiority of elected monarchy over hereditary 
succession.54 Christine de Pizan’s antipathy towards government by “the many” and her 
particular interpretation of the metaphor of the body politic were thus not only 
hierarchical by modern standards but were actually less egalitarian than those of a 
                                                            
51 Aristotle, “Politics”, III: 7; Thomas Aquinas, “Commentary on the Politics”,  Medieval Political 
Philosophy: a Sourcebook, ed. R. Lerner and M. Mahdi, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1963, 
p. 329-32; Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C. I. 
Litzinger, Notre Dame, Dumb Ox, 1993, 1672-8, 1697-8. 
52 Latini, The Book of the Treasure,  p. 118, 350-55, 362. 
53 On the Government of Rulers: De regimine principum. Ptolemy of Lucca with Portions 
Attributed to Thomas Aquinas, ed. J. M. Blythe, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1997, 2:8; 4:1; 4:7.  Ptolemy did concede that local conditions, particularly the existence of larger 
territorial units, might make hereditary monarchy a more appropriate form of authority. 
54 Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of the Peace: the Defensor Pacis, trans. A. Gewirth, New York, 
Harper and Row, 1956, I: XV (p. 61-5);  I: XVI (p. 71-80); I: XVII (p. 80-6); I: XIX (p. 88-9). 
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number of other medieval political theorists, whether “ascending” or “descending” in 
their outlook. 
However, if Ullmann’s “ascending” and “descending” concepts of authority are 
retained as labels for two basic perspectives principles within medieval political theory, 
it should be emphasized that, in practice, these two approaches were not necessarily 
mutually exclusive but rather could be combined to differing degrees within the work of 
any individual writer. Thus, while many thinkers, from Aquinas to Fortescue, followed 
Aristotle in arguing that the “monarchy of the perfect man” was the ideal form of 
government in principle, they also conceded that, in practice, given the frailties of 
human  nature, the best type of polity may be one with a “mixed” constitution which 
combines the virtues – or at least limits the vices – of the different forms of 
government.55 As a result, late medieval political theory did not simply take the form of 
an antithesis between the “ascending” and “descending” conceptions of political power 
but rather constituted a spectrum of different positions between the two poles. Christine 
herself has been seen as advocating a form of “mixed” constitution in her stress on the 
need for rulers to take advice from the wise, learned and experienced and her view of 
political society as a “web of intercession and intervention” by both groups and 
individuals.56 Certainly, Christine took it for granted that, in order to be able to with 
prudence, the prince required the advice of wise counsellors although, when judged by 
this criterion, it is difficult to think of any medieval political theorist, however pro-
monarchical he was, who could not be described as an advocate of a “mixed” form of 
government. However, while Christine followed Giles of Rome in suggesting that 
the prince should listen to the advice of older, wiser counsellors, she was rather 
more inclusive than Giles in her list of those whom he should consult. Thus, whereas 
Giles had simply stressed the need for the ruler to rely on “wise barons that love the 
realm”, Christine recommended the prince to select counsellors from a variety of 
different estates so as to be able to draw upon a range of different areas of expertise 
(GKP: 53; LGR: 41; BP: I: 9-12; BBP/LCP: I: 22). 
Christine’s Livre de paix lists four groups who might counsel the king: 
firstly, knights and esquires who are qualified to “to advise on matters of war”; 
secondly, older knights and nobles who could advise on the management of his royal 
estate; thirdly, jurists, “whether prelates or not”, who would “advise on the 
administration of justice”; finally, “worthy gentlemen of good condition”, who are 
“versed in finance and accounts” who could counsel the prince on how to manage 
his finances. Only in a passing remark does Christine say that the prince can also 
consult “aucun du peuple” as the case requires (BP: I: 10). Christine’s Livre des fais 
d’armes et de la chevalerie (c. 1410) offers a slightly different list of those whom 
the wise prince should consult before going to war. Here she lists older nobles, 
clerks learned in war, the burghers who would have the responsibility of fortifying 
towns and of persuading the common people to help their lord, and finally “some 
representatives of the craftsmen” who should be “carefully approached” so that they 
would be “more inclined to help the lord financially”. As an example of this, she 
cited Charles V who had summoned these four “estates” to his “parliament in Paris” 
before renewing war against England (BDAC: I: 5 (p. 20-1)). Similarly, both the 
                                                            
55 Aristotle, “Politics”, II: 6; III: 7; IV: 2, 8-11; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII, x: 2; Blythe, 
Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages, passim.  
56 Forhan, The Political Theory of Christine de Pizan, p. 75; but see also Ibid., p. 96. 
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Livre de paix and the Livre des fais et bonnes meurs praise Charles V for calling 
upon the counsel of the “bourgeois de ses bonnes villes” and “meismement des 
moyenes gens, et de celz du commun”. However, Christine’s main emphasis here, 
following Aristotle and Giles of Rome, is not so much on the need to call upon the 
counsel of the lesser commons but rather to show the benefits for social harmony of 
the existence of a large middle class (the “moyenes gens”) whose position between 
the rich and the poor helps reduce the conflict and alienation between the two 
extremes within society with the poor, in particular, otherwise being prone to 
seeking to despoil their social opposites (BP: III: 6, 18; LFBM II: 28-30; GKP: 385-
7; LGR: 363-4; DRP: III, ii: xxxiii).57 
Moreover, while Christine certainly saw it as both morally virtuous and 
pragmatically sensible for the ruler to take advice from others, she did not present him 
as being obliged or legally constrained to do so. Likewise, while teaching that 
counsellors should speak truthfully to the prince and even be willing to “censure” and 
“reprimand” him if necessary (in contrast with the flatterers who attend on the tyrant), 
she did not present the prince as being in any sense formally bound by the counsel he 
received. Approaching the issue of counsel from the viewpoint of the prince, rather than 
as a matter of the right of representation of the people, she thus had to depend on the 
prince’s magnanimity and good sense to ensure that he would first “call on” wise 
counsellors and then have the prudence to follow their advice – or to choose wisely 
between conflicting counsels (BP: I: 9-12). As she says in her biography of Charles 
V: the king, out of wisdom and good-will, summoned people to counsel him 
notwithstanding the fact that “de sa seigneurie et autorité”, he could “faire et ordener de 
tout à son bon plaisir” ( LFBM II: 28-30). There may be an echo of here of the Roman 
law teaching that “What pleases the prince has force of law”, a maxim which was a 
commonplace amongst those medieval political theorists who sought to defend 
monarchical authority.58 While we might expect Christine’s eulogistic account of the 
life of Charles V to focus on the king as the architect whose overall vision guided the 
generals and officials whom he used as his instruments, what is striking is that her 
account of the body politic in her Livre du corps de policie is similarly head-
orientated. For instance, unlike the Policraticus, where John of Salisbury has 
“Plutarch” refer to the “senate” as the “heart” of the body politic, the Livre du corps de 
policie makes no mention of any formal assembly in its vision of the ideal body politic, 
even though Christine was familiar with the Roman Senate and its conciliar functions. 
Similarly, she equated the Roman consuls with “princes and dukes” of her own time 
and with the “leader of a great army” rather than with elected officials (Pol: V: 9 (p. 
81); BBP/LCP: I: 7; I: 29; II: 4-5; II: 10; II: 13-14). 
Equally significant is what she omits from her body politic in the Livre du corps 
de policie, i.e.,  any mention of the representative local or national assemblies or forms 
of popular association that were found in the France of the 14th and 15th centuries.59 Nor, 
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59 M. T. Lorcin, “Christine de Pizan: analyste de la société”, The City of Scholars: New 
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in contrast to her focus on the individual morality of the prince, did she show any 
interest in the detail of the nature of the assemblies or of the forms of counsel on which 
the king might rely. Thus, while Christine taught that the prince should make himself 
accessible to his subjects so as to be able to provide justice to them, that he should 
listen to their petitions and that he should respond to their legitimate complaints, this 
was very different from a theory of political representation in which subjects had 
some degree of ability to restrain their rulers (BP: II: 14; III: 1, 18). As Christine put 
it in her Chemin de long estude, explicitly referring to the metaphor of the body politic 
as it appeared in Plutarch’s supposed letter to Trajan: “Of which body is the prince 
head,/By which all members will be led,/For as the head is over all,/The members must 
await his call/Which governs all the rest at will/Giving commands which then fulfil/The 
senses which control the rest” (CLE: 5493-5504).60 If Christine it to be seen as an 
advocate of a “mixed” constitution, then the fact that, like many other political writers 
of the time, she saw a strong and authoritative monarchy as the answer to the 
internal disorder and external menaces which threatened France meant that, on the 
spectrum from “descending” to “ascending” views of political authority, she herself 
stood well towards the hierarchical or “descending” end of scale. 
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